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in its judgment, such harm has been done to the accused as to require a new trial. State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659, 15 S.E. 412
(1892).
In West Virginia, as in the federal courts, the specific question
of whether or not a co-defendant's attorney may comment on defendant's failure to testify has not been decided. However, the court
has strongly implied that it will construe the provisions of the statute
very strictly, and will permit no comment whatsoever on a defendant's
failure to testify. In State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 234, 50 S.E. 247,
249 (1905) which involved comment on an accused's failure to call
his wife to corroborate his testimony, the court said that the statutory terms are very broad and that ".

.

. all persons are forbidden

to make any reference to his failure [to testify]."
Thus, the dilemma presented by De Luna v. United States, supra,
seems not to arise in West Virginia. The co-defendant's absolute
right to be separately tried, coupled with the statutory prohibition
against any comment concerning an accused's failure to take the
stand, furnishes as perfect a solution to the problem as could reasonably be expected. Perhaps the problem could be best resolved
in the federal courts by providing for separate trial of jointly indicted
defendants where it is shown that one expects to take the stand to
testify and the other expects to remain silent.
Robert Edward Haden

Evidence-Federal Shop-Book Rule-Admissibility of
Hospital Records
P brought an action for injuries sustained when struck by D's
automobile. The trial court refused to admit in evidence the results
of a test for intoxication conducted on P at the Navy hospital where
he was treated. The district court rendered a judgment for P and D
appealed. Held, reversed and remaided for a new trial. The court
of appeals held that prejudicial error was committed in excluding
from evidence the hospital records showing results of the intoxication test, such being properly admissible in evidence under the
federal shop-book rule. Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1962).
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The immediate problem involved admission of hospital records
as evidence under the federal shop-book rule, one of the recognized
exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W. Va. 708,
68 S.E.2d 361 (1951). The shop-book rule, rigidly applied under the
early common law, is being applied more liberally by the courts today. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 283 (1954). The statutory federal
shop-book rule provides that records kept in the ordinary course of
business should be admissible in evidence. Business is broadly defined to include business, professions, occupations and callings of
every kind. 62 Stat. 945 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1958).
Some courts, even today, have been reluctant to include hospital records under the regular entries concept of the shop-book
rule, but Professor McCormick points out that the safeguards of
trustworthiness of the records of a modem hospital are at least as
substantial as the guarantees of reliability of the records of business
establishments. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 290 (1954). In order
to qualify as a business entry, the record must show that the document is actually a record of an act, condition or event. The record
must be relevant and the custodian of the record or another qualified witness must testify to its identity and the mode of its preparation. It must be shown that it was made in the regular course of
business and was entered at or near the time of the act, condition or
event. Cascade Lumber Terminal v. Cvitanovich, 215 Ore. 111,
332 P.2d 1061 (1958).
In the principal case the question presented was whether a
hospital record containing an entry showing the result of a test for
intoxication was admissible as a business record. The court was
divided on this issue, but the majority decided that the records should
be admitted, following the holding in a previous case that hospital
records, including an entry showing the results of a test for intoxication, were admissible where the test was recorded according to the
regular routine of the hospital and was performed in the regular
course of the hospital's business. Kissinger v. Frankhouser, 308 F.2d
348 (4th Cir. 1962). In an earlier decision by this same court it
was held that a certificate showing the alcoholic content of a sample
of blood determined by chemical analysis was properly received in
evidence under the federal shop-book rule. Kay v. United States, 255
F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1958).
The same judges dissented in the principal case and the Kissinger case. The dissent in the Kissinger case expressed the view
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that the court had expanded the application of the federal shop-book
rule far beyond its intendment, contending that the entry in issue
amounted to an impression and should not be admitted. While
courts hold that the business record statute should be liberally construed, the mere fact that a record would be generally admissible
does not mean that any and everything contained in the record is
necessarily admissible. When the statute is applied to hospital records, the entry must be pertinent to the care or treatment of the
patient in order to be admissible. Maggi v. Mendillo, 147 Conn.
663, 165 A.2d 603 (1960).
Texas has determined that facts involving medical opinions are
not admissible. The determination whether hospital records consisted of factual statements by doctors or were based on opinions
or conclusions should be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Martinez v. Williams, 312 S.E.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
Also, the Fifth Circuit Court seems to favor limiting the scope of
hospital entries which can properly be admitted, and will admit
hospital records in evidence only to show what treatment the patient
received, the cost of services and related facts. Missouri Pac. R.R.
v. Soileau, 265 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1959).
In dealing with this area of the admissibility of business records
as evidence, several states have adopted the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. In discussing the admissibility of hospital
records under the Act, the Ohio court has held that those portions
of hospital records made in the regular course of business and pertaining to the business of hospitalization and recording observable
acts, transactions, occurrences or events incident to the treatment
of a patient were admissible. Further the court has held that the
purpose of this act was to liberalize and broaden the shop-book rule
and to permit the admission of records regularly kept in the course
of the business, and, as applied to hospital records, to avoid the
necessity and expense, inconvenience and sometimes the impossibility of calling the witnesses who have collaborated to make the
record. Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947).
The West Virginia Legislature has not adopted the Uniform
Act. The Supreme Court of Appeals seems inclined to the position
that it is unnecessary to determine to what extent and in what circumstances a hospital record may be introduced in evidence. The
court held that if the records had been properly identified and were
shown to have been made in the regular course of treatment they
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may be admissible, within proper limits, by analogy to rules governing
the keeping of books and records generally. Cline v. Evans, 127
W. Va. 113, 31 S.E.2d. 681 (1944). In the later case of Keller
v. Wonn, 140 W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d. 453 (1955), the court, without spelling out a rule applicable to all entries in hospital records,
was of the opinion that routine entries and perhaps ordinary diagnostic
findings, based upon objective data and not presenting a question of
obvious difficult interpretation, should be admitted. For a comparision of the existing West Virginia law and the provisions of the
Uniform Act, see 60 W. VA. L. REv. 321, 328 (1958).
The conclusions of the majority of the court in principal case
seem to be in accord with the present day liberal construction of
the shop-book rule. The West Virginia Supreme Court has taken
steps in this direction but it would appear that the adoption of the
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act would greatly clarify
this area of admissibility of evidence.
Eugene Triplett Hague, Jr.

Federal Courts-Diversity Jurisdiction by AssignmentImproper or Collusive.
P was sole stockholder of an insolvent corporation. The corporation assigned to P all claims which the corporation had or might
have against D. In consideration thereof, P had paid, or orally
agreed to pay, a substantial part of the corporation's indebtedness.
The corporation and D were of like citizenship while P was a citizen
of another state. The assignment was made for the purpose of gaining admission to the federal court on diversity. The trial court held
that it did have jurisdiction, but certified the question to the circuit
court as one where there was "substantial grounds for difference of
opinion". Held, affirmed. The assignment was not "improper or
collusive" within the meaning of 62 Stat. 935 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 1359 (1958), because P had paid, or agreed to pay, the debts of
an insolvent corporation as consideration for the assignment. Until
the time of the challenged assignment P was not the sole owner of
the claim against D and was not the real party in interest. Bradbury
v. Dennis, 310 F.2d 73 (10th Cir. 1962).
As the instant case is another example of an assignment that
is not "collusive or improper", even though it was made for the
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